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Abstract: 
With heterogeneous endowments, subjects collectively choose between a lottery contest, where 
only one individual in a group receives an award, and a public good which benefits the less-
endowed more. Unlike standard theoretical predictions, the majority of the subjects vote for the 
public good regardless of the award size in the contest. Also, the subjects’ average risk 
preferences don’t differ by voter type. Furthermore, their payoffs, whether ex-ante expected 
payoffs based on beliefs or ex-post payoffs, are more equally distributed in the public good 
regime. These suggest that people’s collective institutional choices may be driven by inequality-
averse concerns in our context. 
JEL classification: C92, D04, D70, H41 
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1.  Introduction 
The prevalence of heterogeneous resources is one of the most fundamental features of our 
organizations and societies today (e.g., Stiglitz 2012, Piketty 2014). For example, there are wide 
income gaps within a society. The Gini coefficient of household disposable incomes is on 
average 0.31 even in OECD countries.
1
 Likewise, in organizations, the competence of workers is 
diverse even if they have similar work experiences, which may create salary gaps among them. It 
is also often the case that the distributions of resources are skewed to the right. While the 
heterogeneity of resources has some positive aspects such as potential to increase material gains, 
it nonetheless has negative aspects. For instance, inequality in society often leads to serious intra-
group conflicts.
2
 We therefore face a difficult collective decision to make: as an organization or a 
society, should we promote competition by which ex-post inequality may be enhanced? Or 
should we lead to a more equal environment by offering some redistribution mechanism?    
People’s collective choices on policies have important consequences for resulting norms 
and situations at organizations or societies. Incentive schemes such as tournaments that are used 
in firms may contribute to increasing productivity of workers and thus perhaps seem to bring 
better material outcomes in a management’s view. Such competition-oriented policies may, 
however, lead to more uncooperative behaviors among workers. Some companies take 
approaches to compress their heterogeneous competence, such as voluntary mentoring and 
education programs. While these programs may help workers maintain harmony, they may 
demotivate high-skilled workers if they want higher compensations. For another example, 
voluntary activities at charitable organizations are supported by the reduction of tax requirements 
in order to alleviate poverty in a society. This policy would help shrink the income gap and 
create a fairer society. However, it may displease those with wealth who would lead the 
economic growth of the society as they cannot enjoy the benefits. In addition, the presence of 
such redistribution mechanisms may reduce people’s work motivation.  
In modern democratic societies, people have rights to either directly or indirectly choose 
their preferred policies through their votes. Given the fact that highly-endowed persons account 
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 See OECD Factbook 2013 (DOI : 10.1787/18147364). 
2
 In a firm, wage inequality may be helpful in securing or attracting highly skilled workers, but it may also decrease 
work motivation among low-skilled workers and may cause disharmony among workers in interdependent work 
(e.g., Akerlof and Yellen 1998, Trevor et al. 2012). For another example, inequality increases anti-social behavior 
such as violent crime in societies (e.g., Kelly 2000). 
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for a very small percentage of the population, one may expect to see most countries or 
organizations employing strong redistributive or cooperative policies. In reality, however, we do 
not observe a large degree of redistribution. This field observation may not reflect the 
population’s collective distributional preferences. For example, the literature on political 
economy explains that the moderate redistributive policies could be the outcome of the political 
process, such as low voter turnout of low-income people, party royalty and electoral competition 
in representative democracy (see Harms and Zink (2003) for a survey). It is also possible that the 
less-endowed may in fact prefer light redistributive policies for various reasons. For instance, 
they may tolerate inequality if have the prospect of upward mobility (pages 657-665 of Harms 
and Zink 2003). In recent decades, economists have actively studied people’s collective 
institutional choices using laboratory experiments. However, little attention has been paid to how 
people collectively prefer to implement institutions, either competitive or cooperative, within a 
group with heterogeneous endowments and this remains as an empirical question to be answered.  
Exploring behavioral principles for people’s collective choices on this topic is not 
straightforward, however. First, past extensive experiments have found that some individuals 
have other-regarding preferences such as inequality aversion (see Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a 
survey). For example, some people may enjoy higher non-material gains if their payoffs are 
similar to each other. Therefore, we cannot infer their institutional choices only from their 
material incentives. Second, recent experiments show that egalitarian subjects − those who prefer 
fair distribution of payoffs − are more likely to stay away from competitive environments when 
self-selecting their environments in real-effort experiments (e.g., Bartling et al. 2007, Balafoutas 
et al. 2012).
3
 The more egalitarian preferences they have, the less likely they may be to support 
competitive institutions in our context. The voting decisions of the egalitarian individuals 
nonetheless may depend on the degree of material incentives under the competitive regime. A 
person might, even if she is strongly inequality-averse, support a competitive institution if her 
potential benefits from competition are sufficiently high. In addition, their voting decisions may 
also depend on their assigned endowments as their material incentives or non-material incentives 
differ by the endowment. Third, other-regarding preferences in a risky situation are still a new 
research area to be explored. Having a competitive institution involves a risk in which people 
obtain lower returns if they lose competition. People’s decisions might be based on ex-ante 
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 The subjects made choices between a tournament and a piece rate scheme in these two papers.  
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comparison (i.e., opportunities), the distribution of ex-post payoffs, or a mix of the two (e.g., 
Brock et al. 2013). Fourth, a rich experimental literature has found that in situations where their 
resources are unbalanced, those vested with larger (smaller) resources behave more (less) 
selfishly (e.g., Buckley and Croson 2006, Chan et al. 1996, Cherry et al. 2005, Maurice et al. 
2013). This tension between higher and lesser endowed members may be severe enough for them 
to collectively choose a more competitive environment if there is such an opportunity.  
We conduct an experiment in order to study people’s collective institutional choices 
between a competitive scheme versus a public good scheme that helps the less-endowed more 
when their resources are unequally distributed. A novel feature of our experimental design is to 
let subjects collectively select one from two fundamentally different institutions under each of 
which the same endowments can be used. The group size is five. Endowments are unbalanced 
across subjects; endowments are randomly assigned to the subjects at the onset of the experiment. 
Specifically, one member receives an endowment of 50 points, two members each receive 20 
points, and the remaining two members each receive 10 points. Each group then collectively 
chooses one out of two regimes by voting: a public good regime and a competitive lottery contest 
regime. This is the only collective vote decision. A group has a social dilemma when it 
collectively implements the public good. Under this regime, each member makes allocation 
decisions between their private account and public account using their own endowments. They 
get one point for each point they allocate to their private account. The total contributions to their 
public account are doubled and are then redistributed among the members. The distribution rule 
is that the smaller endowments they have, the more they receive from the public account. By 
contrast, members compete for an award of 50 points or 110 points if a group collectively selects 
the lottery contest regime. Under this regime, each member decides how many points they 
allocate to their lottery account. The more points a subject assigns to the account the more likely 
she is to win the competition and receive the award. Only one member wins the competition in 
the contest regime. Because each subject has an opportunity to win the competition, ex-ante 
expected payoffs within a group are more equally distributed in the contest regime than in the 
public good regime, according to the standard theoretical assumption of all being selfish. 
Subjects would, however, have a greater ex-post inequality in the end if they choose the contest 
as only one individual in a group receives an award. The policy implementation decision and 
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their interaction under a collectively selected regime are one-shot.
4
 Their beliefs on the allocation 
decisions of the other four group members under collectively selected regimes and their risk 
attitudes are elicited in order to explore driving forces behind their institutional choices. 
Our data shows that a majority of the subjects, around 70% to 80% of the entire subjects, 
prefer having the public good, contrary to the standard theoretical prediction. It also indicates 
that the likelihood of the subjects selecting the public good and their endowment amounts are 
negatively correlated. A closer look at the data suggests a possible cause of the negative 
correlation. We find that while less-endowed subjects believe that they are materially better off 
in expectation under the public goods regime, the subjects with high endowments believe that 
they can earn more money under the lottery contest when the award is high.  
The award size in the lottery contest determines which regime the subjects believe has 
bigger material incentives. However, the percentages of the supporters for the public good are 
not affected by the size of the award in the lottery contest regime. Moreover, under the public 
good regime, not everyone behaves for the sake of others. Once the public good is collectively 
chosen, the subjects with the high endowment contribute much smaller percentages of their 
endowment to the public accounts, compared with the subjects with lower endowment. This 
behavior of the highly-endowed subjects is anticipated by the less-endowed subjects. 
A comparison of the distributions of payoffs suggest that the subjects’ collective 
institutional choices may be driven by their (either ex-ante or ex-post) inequality-averse motives 
in our context. The average Gini coefficients of realized payoffs within groups are significantly 
smaller in the public good regime than in the lottery contest regime. In addition, subjects also on 
average believe that their payoffs are more equally distributed in their groups if the public good 
regime is implemented. The subjects’ risk attitudes, by contrast, are statistically similar between 
those who vote for the public good and those who vote for the lottery contest. These results 
imply that people have a collective preference for a policy with a public good aspect rather than 
a competitive policy if the competitive one enlarges inequality among the members when their 
resources are unequally distributed. 
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 This experimental setup is used to obtain data without reputation effects. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our experimental design. 
Section 3 provides the theoretical predictions and hypotheses. Section 4 reports results, and 
Section 5 discusses our results and concludes. 
2.  Experimental Design 
The experiment consists of two phases. The first phase is a stage in which endowments 
are randomly given to subjects. The second phase is a voting decision stage, followed by an 
allocation stage. Subjects collectively make one-time policy implementation decisions and 
individual allocation decisions in Phase 2. Our study consists of two main treatments in which 
either a public good or a lottery contest is endogenously selected by subjects’ votes. We also 
conduct one control treatment in which a public good is exogenously imposed in Phase 2 in order 
to examine whether the democracy premium affects their votes for the case that they collectively 
choose a public good (Table 1).
5
  
At the onset of Phase 1, subjects in all treatments are randomly assigned to a group of 
five individuals. We use a partner-matching protocol: the group composition does not change 
between Phase 1 and Phase 2. Phase 1 plays a role in generating an unequal distribution of 
endowments among members. In each group, one subject receives 50 points, two subjects each 
receive 20 points, and the remaining two each are given 10 points. The assignment of 
endowments is random: the probabilities with which they receive 50, 20 and 10 points are 1/5, 
2/5 and 2/5, respectively. We refer to the set of subjects who are given 50, 20 and 10 points as 
their endowments as Sets H, M and L, respectively. Note that the endowments of the Set M and 
Set L subjects are less than the average in their groups, 22 (= (50+20∙2+10∙2)/5). 
 In the two main treatments, the Low and High treatments - dubbed L and H, Phase 2 
begins with subjects’ voting decisions concerning whether to create a public good or to 
implement a lottery contest, contingent on two voting rules: an equal and a weighted voting rule 
(see Section 2.2). Subjects subsequently submit their beliefs on the other members’ voting 
decisions. In order to avoid a hedging problem, the belief elicitation task is not incentivized. Also, 
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  We also conducted one additional treatment as a robustness check of our results to a very large award under the 
contest regime. It turns out that our results are robust. See Section 4 for the details. 
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we do not tell subjects about the presence of the elicitation task at the onset of the experiment.
6
 
After that, the computer randomly assigns one of the two voting rules for each group. The public 
good or the lottery contest is then collectively implemented in accordance with the result of their 
votes; and each subject makes an allocation decision under a selected regime as explained in 
Section 2.1. (In the control treatment, which is called the Exogenous Public Good treatment, 
subjects do not vote on the two regimes; they make contribution decisions based on their 
endowments to their groups’ public goods.) Once all subjects complete their allocation decisions, 
they submit their beliefs on the other four members’ allocation decisions before being informed 
of the outcomes of the allocation stage. As in the first belief elicitation task, this elicitation task 
is also not incentivized. However, at the end of the experiment, just before they are informed of 
the outcome of the allocation decisions, all subjects are asked to answer incentivized questions 
concerning their risk attitudes (see Section 2.3).
7
 Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of the experiment. 
We will explain each piece of the design in details below. 
2.1. Two Possible Regimes: The Target of Collective Choices 
The public good, one of the options of the vote, corresponds to goods and services, such 
as voluntary mentoring or education programs for employees in corporations, poverty alleviation 
programs in international organizations, or some redistribution mechanisms in societies. If the 
public good is created in a group, then each subject in the group simultaneously makes an 
allocation decision between their private account and the public account. Their contributions 
must be integers between 0 and their own endowments (50, 20 or 10). As usual in voluntary 
contribution game experiments, a subject gets one point for each point that she allocates to her 
private account. The allocation to the public account, by contrast, is doubled and redistributed 
among members: 25% of the amounts are given to each of the two Set L subjects, 20% of them 
are given to each of the two Set M subjects and 10% of them are given to the Set H subject (note 
that 25%  2 + 20%  2 + 10% = 100%). In other words, the distribution rule is that the less 
resources a member has, the more the member receives from the public account. This 
redistribution rule is often prevalent in the real world. For example, such funds in international 
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 They are instead told that some additional questions related to the experiment may be asked while the experiment 
is in progress and that their responses to these questions will not affect their payoffs. 
7
 They are not told about the presence of this task at the onset of the experiment. They are instead told that some 
additional questions unrelated to the main part of the experiment may be asked. 
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organizations are often used to help less-developed countries. In a society, various policies such 
as public welfare assistance are generally used to help the poor. In a firm, voluntary “buddies” 
programs tend to help less-skilled workers more than highly skilled workers. 
 Suppose that the public good is put in place in a group and a member having an 
endowment    contributes    to the public good. Then, her payoff, πi, is expressed as follows: 
                   
 
   , (1) 
where       if subject i is a Set H subject;       if subject i is a Set M subject; and        
if subject i is a Set L subject. The first term,      , refers to the payoff of subject i from her 
private account. 
By contrast, when the lottery contest is collectively implemented in a group, subjects 
compete with the other four members for an award. Specifically, each member in the group 
simultaneously decides an allocation amount to their lottery account. The award is 50 points (110 
points) and the competition is low (high) in the L treatment (the H treatment). Only one member 
in the group receives the award. Each subject in this regime can increase the probability of 
winning the competitive battle by raising their allocation amounts to their lottery account. 
Suppose that subject i makes an investment of xi out of his endowment Ei and also that the other 
four members allocate X-i in total to their lottery accounts. Then, subject i’s probability of 
obtaining the award is 
  
      
. xi must be non-negative and less than or equal to her endowment 
(Ei). When all five members allocate nothing (i.e.,      for all i), then the award is randomly 
given to one of the members (i.e., each receives it with a probability of 20%).
8
 They receive their 
remaining points after investment, Ei − xi, as a part of their payoff. The competition in the lottery 
contest is also prevalent in our real world. For example, in organizations, workers’ capacities or 
resources vary by employee as in our paper. It is often the case that the more efforts they exert, 
the more likely they are to get promoted to a higher position. The chances of promotion, however, 
would negatively depend on the contributions of other workers in the firm as higher-ranked 
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 This experimental setup is employed to make the experiment simple, although we notice that this may be a little 
unrealistic. An alternative, a more realistic setup could be to set the size of prize positively proportional to the total 
allocations in a group. In our setup, the size of prize is a sufficiently high constant, regardless of the total allocation 
amounts. In other words, our lottery contest regime would be more attractive to the subjects than the alternative 
mentioned above with regards to material incentives. We find that our subjects, nevertheless, choose a public good 
regime, rather than the lottery contest regime in the experiment (see Section 4). 
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positions are limited. In competitions across countries for research and development, the chances 
that a national company succeeds in developing a new technology ahead of other companies 
depends on its relative investment amount of resources.  
 Once all subjects make their allocation decisions under one of the two regimes, they are 
asked about their beliefs on how other members made allocation decisions. Specifically, a Set H 
subject is asked about his or her beliefs on the average allocation of the two Set M subjects and 
that of the two Set L subjects in her group. A Set M (Set L) subject is asked about his or her 
beliefs on (a) the allocation of the Set H subject, (b) the allocation of the other Set M (Set L) 
subject and (c) the average allocation of the two Set L (Set M) subjects in her group. These 
elicited beliefs are used in analysis to calculate (expected) payoff that each subject believes they 
would obtain under their collectively implemented regime. This information would be helpful in 
understanding causes of their voting decisions as discussed in Sections 3 and 4.  
2.2. Voting Rules 
Our study lets subjects vote under the two voting rules: a weighted voting rule and an 
equal voting rule and assesses the effects of voting power on their collective institutional choices 
as an additional analysis.
9
 This analysis is conducted as it is shown that collective institutional 
choices may differ by voting rule. For instance, Markussen, Reuben and Tyran (2014) have 
experimentally found that an inter-group competitive scheme is more likely to be selected in a 
set of three groups when an equal voting rule (i.e., a voting rule that imposes a policy if the 
majority of the three group members support it) is used, relative to when a group veto rule (i.e., a 
rule that imposes a policy if the majority of each group supports it) is used. Collective outcomes 
may differ by voting rule in our study as well because subjects’ voting decisions may be affected 
by the heterogeneity of their endowments, considering that their incentives (material or non-
material) under each regime may differ by the amount of endowments they are given. 
Specifically, in the L and H treatments, at the onset of Phase 2, subjects vote on whether 
to have the public good or the lottery contest for each of the two scenarios: (1) the equal voting 
rule is used and (2) the weighted voting rule is used. After all subjects complete their decisions, 
they are subsequently asked about their beliefs concerning how the others in their groups voted 
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 Weighted voting rules are often used in organizations or societies (e.g., Leech 2002, Rapkin and Strand 2006). 
Examples include collective decision-making in IMF and IBRD or in shareholder meetings of a corporation. 
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before they are informed of its collective outcomes.
10
  The two voting decisions are incentive 
compatible. Once all subjects submit their voting decisions and the subsequent questions on their 
beliefs, the computer assigns either the equal or weighted voting rule for each group with a 
probability of 50% each. Then, one of the two voting decisions made by each subject is cast as 
their vote.
11
 When the weighted voting rule is assigned to a group, the voting power of subject i 
is Ei/110.  Here, 110 yields from 50 + 20 + 20 + 10 + 10 (the sum of endowments in a group). 
Consequently, the distribution of voting power among the members is unequal: the more 
resources a subject has, the more his or her vote influences the outcome. The voting power of the 
Set H subjects is the largest. However, it is not possible for them alone to decide the adoption of 
the policy by their votes, as their voting power equals 50/110, which is not greater than 0.5, in 
their groups. Therefore, the votes cast by the subjects belonging to the Sets M and L also 
influence each group’s collective decision, although they influence the result of their collective 
decisions less than those of the Set H subjects do. When the equal voting rule is assigned to a 
group, then, the voting power is one-fifth for each subject. In other words, the standard majority 
rule determines each group’s regime, either the public good or the lottery contest. 
2.3. Elicitation of Risk Preferences 
Once all subjects submit their beliefs on the other four members’ allocations to either a 
public account or a lottery account, they are subsequently asked to answer questions concerning 
risk attitudes. The questionnaire on risk attitudes consists of the ten questions used in Holt and 
Laury (2002). We include this task in order to study whether their voting preferences between 
the two regimes are affected by their risk attitudes as discussed in Section 3.  
3. Theoretical Predictions 
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 For example, each Set M subject is asked about their belief on the voting decision made by their Set H subject, the 
decision made by the other Set M subject, and the decisions made by the two Set L subjects for each of the two 
voting rules. 
11
 This kind of strategy method is commonly used when there is a need to obtain a sufficient number of incentive-
compatible decisions under each of many possible conditions. For example, in Fehr, Herz and Wilkening (2013), 
who study the value of individual decision rights in a principal-agent framework, a principal first decides whether or 
not to delegate a decision right to an agent; and then, before the principal and the agent are informed of the 
delegation decision, both players choose their effort levels as well as their beliefs about their matched partners’ 
effort levels, contingent on whether they have a right to decide, using a strategy method. In Dal Bó, Foster and 
Putterman (2011) and Kamei (2014), who study the impact of endogenous decision-making on people’s pro-social 
behavior, all subjects make voting decisions on implementation of a policy before implementation conditions (either 
endogenous or exogenous) are assigned to their groups. After their voting decisions, the computer randomly assigns 
either an endogenous or exogenous condition to each group. 
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 A group has a collective action dilemma if the public good is collectively selected in that 
group. This is because the MPCR (marginal per capita return) is     , which is less than 1 for 
each subject, as shown in Eq. (1). Therefore, according to the standard theory, contributing 
nothing to their public account is a strictly dominant strategy for each group member. The Set H, 
Set M and Set L subjects obtain 50 points, 20 points and 10 points, respectively, as their payoffs 
under Nash Equilibrium (NE).  
 By contrast, if the lottery contest is collectively implemented in a group, the group 
members can enjoy some expected gains, regardless of whether they are risk averse. Suppose 
that each member in a group is risk neutral. Then, the utility function of a subject is proportional 
to his or her expected payoff. The expected payoff of subject i,      , is calculated by: 
               
  
      
 .  (2) 
Here, z = 50 (110) in the L (H) treatment.  Under this assumption, we find that all members, 
regardless of their endowments, choose to allocate eight points to their lottery account in order to 
maximize their expected payoffs in the L treatment (see Appendix A.1). They can each raise 
their expected payoffs by two points in equilibrium in the L treatment. Optimal allocation 
amounts differ by their endowment in the H treatment: the Set H, Set M and Set L subjects 
allocate 21, 20 and 10 points, respectively, to their lottery accounts in equilibrium. This means 
that the probability of winning the competitive battle is the highest (the lowest) for the Set H 
subjects (Set L subjects) in the H treatment. As shown in Table 1, nevertheless, the expected 
payoff of each category of subjects is higher in equilibrium in the H treatment than in the L 
treatment (see Table 1). Standard theory therefore predicts that subjects prefer to have the lottery 
contest in both the L and H treatments under the assumption of the risk-neutral preference. 
 The advantage of the lottery contest over the public good does not change even if we 
instead assume that subjects are risk-averse. This is because they can allocate amounts as small 
as possible to the lottery accounts if they wish to while securing a chance of receiving an award 
in case all of the other four members allocate smaller points to the lottery accounts. 
Prediction 1: Standard Theoretical Predictions. 
12 
 
Subjects allocate nothing to their public accounts when the public good regime is imposed in 
their groups. By contrast, they enjoy positive expected gains when the lottery contest regime is 
imposed. They therefore vote in favor of having the lottery contest in their groups. 
 However, experiments in recent decades have found that people have other-regarding 
preferences, such as inequality aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 
2000) and reciprocity (e.g., Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk and 
Fischbacher 2006). These preference models predict that some subjects contribute positive 
amounts to their public accounts and thus some of them enjoy payoffs higher than their own 
endowment amounts under the public good regime. As a result, their preferences between the 
two regimes may be different from Prediction 1. Suppose that subjects have inequality-averse 
preferences. For simplicity, we assume that subject i has the following utility function: 
                  
 
   
        
  
   .  (3) 
Here,    is utility weight of subject i on inequality and N is group size (N = 5).
12
 Subjects are 
assumed to be heterogeneous:    differs by subject. As illustrated in Appendix A.2, the mutual 
full free-riding equilibrium (i.e.,      for all i) no longer occurs for a broad range of  . 
Moreover, the inequality-aversion model predicts that a higher percentage of the Set H subjects, 
compared with the Set L subjects, allocate positive amounts to their public accounts regardless of 
the decisions of the Set L or Set M subjects as the endowments of the Set H subjects are much 
higher than those of Set L subjects. The inequality-averse model also predicts conditional 
cooperative behavior of the Set L and Set M subjects. This is because the Set L subjects (the Set 
M subjects) do not like inequality between themselves and the other Set L subjects (the other Set 
M subjects) or the two Set M subjects (the two Set L subjects). It is also because the Set L 
subjects (the Set M subjects) want to avoid having inequality with the Set H subjects when Set L 
subjects (Set M subjects) obtain very high payoffs thanks to the others’ decisions.  
Prediction 2: Contribution to the Public Good Based on Inequality Aversion. 
(a) Some subjects contribute positive amounts to their public accounts. (b) A higher percentage 
of the Set H subjects, relative to the Set L subjects, contribute positive amounts to their public 
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 A similar utility function is used in Chen and Kamei (2014). The use of a quadratic form, instead of the prominent 
functional form proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), is due to its tractability.  
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accounts, regardless of the decisions of the Set M and Set L subjects. (c) The contribution 
decision of a Set L subject (a Set M subject) is conditional, dependent on the contributions of the 
others: it is positively propositional to his or her beliefs on the contribution decision of the Set H 
subject, the contribution decision of the other Set L subject (the other Set M subject), and the 
average contribution decision of the two Set M subjects (the two Set L subjects). 
 We note that regarding prediction (b), a Set H subject’s optimal contribution amount may 
depend on her beliefs in the experiment. She may decide how much inequality to reduce in her 
group, according to her utility weight on inequality ( ). For instance, suppose that a Set H 
subject believes that each of the two Set M subjects contributes 7 points and each of the two Set 
L subjects contributes 0 points to the public account. In that case, if the Set H subject contributes 
33 points to her public account, the five subjects obtain almost the same payoffs and hence the 
Gini Coefficient in her group would be minimized (which is .0075) according to her beliefs.
13
 
However, most likely she would choose to contribute less than 33 points as her material payoff 
would have some weight on her utility. 
 In the lottery contest regime, only one individual in a group wins a large award (50 or 
110 points). The subjects do not know who will win the competition beforehand. Predictions 
based on social preferences in such a risky environment need an additional assumption regarding 
the subjects’ decision-making principles. There are two ways to model social preferences in this 
environment, as studied in Brock et al. (2013). One way is to assume that a subject i cares about 
the ex-post distribution of income in her group. Under this assumption, as shown in Eq. (3), the 
inequality-averse agent incurs a large utility loss due to a high inequality in the lottery contest 
regime, regardless of whether the agent wins or loses the competition.
14
 Therefore, those who are 
concerned more about ex-post inequality would be more likely to vote for the public good 
regime. Combined with Prediction 2(a), we have the following prediction for voting behavior: 
Prediction 3: Voting Decisions Based on Ex-post Inequality Aversion. 
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 In this example, the set H subject obtains a payoff of 21.7 points, each of the two Set M subjects obtains a payoff 
of 22.4 points, and each of the two Set L subjects obtains a payoff of 21.75 points. 
14
                              
 
   
          
     
 
   , where    is the probability distribution of each 
member’s winning in the group of subject i based on (a) subject i’s own allocation decision and (b) subject i’s belief 
about the allocation decisions made by the other four members to their lottery accounts under the contest regime. 
          
     
 
    is much larger in the contest regime than the one in the public good regime. 
14 
 
If subjects care about ex-post inequality within their groups and Prediction 2(a) holds, then 
some of them vote in favor of the public good regime, rather than the lottery contest regime. 
 Another way to model social preferences in a risky environment is based on the subjects’ 
likelihood to win the contest (see Brock et al. for this modeling also). If a subject i cares about 
ex-ante opportunities to receive high payoffs, then we can assume that subject i has a utility 
function which depends on the expected utility of him and his four peers:                    . The 
degree of inequality is measured by using the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient of the 
equilibrium expected payoffs with the standard theoretical assumption is .327 under the public 
good regime (five members’ payoffs are 50, 20, 20, 10, 10), .300 under the contest regime with 
prize of 50 (five members’ payoffs are 52, 22, 22, 12, 12), and .292 under the contest regime 
with prize of 110 (five members’ payoffs are 57.5, 27.2, 27.2, 13.6, 13.6). Therefore, in a world 
where all subjects behave selfishly, the public good regime has more unequal ex-ante expected 
payoff distribution. This implies that if the subjects care about ex-ante inequality, rather than ex-
post inequality, they do not vote in favor of the public good regime unless Prediction 2(a) holds.  
 A comparison of the above three Gini coefficients also reveals that ex-ante inequality in 
the contest regime is somewhat lower in the H treatment than in the L treatment. Recall that the 
expected payoff for each category of the subjects (Set H, M and L) under the standard theory is 
higher in the H treatment than in the L treatment. We therefore have the following prediction 
about the subjects’ voting decisions:  
Prediction 4: Voting Decisions Solely Based on the Ex-ante Inequality Aversion.  
If risk attitudes do not drive the subjects’ institutional choices between the public good and the 
contest regime, then a significantly higher proportion of the subjects in the H treatment, 
compared with the L treatment, vote in favor of having the lottery contest regime.  
 There is also a possibility that subjects’ risk preferences do drive their institutional 
choices even when subjects have social preferences. The distribution of a subject’s ex-post 
payoffs substantially differs between the two regimes. The range of his or her possible payoffs is 
larger in the lottery contest regime. This means that a higher payoff is possible, but they obtain 
nothing from their lottery accounts if they lose the competition. Especially, the contest regime in 
the H treatment generates a higher expected return, but the subjects may perceive it is more risky 
15 
 
as they believe that larger amounts must be allocated to their lottery accounts in order to win the 
competition as in Table 1. Hence, more risk-averse subjects may vote in favor of the public good.  
Prediction 5: Risk Preferences and Voting Decisions. 
More risk-averse (risk-loving) subjects vote for the public good (the lottery contest).  
 We can test Prediction 5 using the risk elicitation task by Holt and Laury (2002). This 
task consists of ten questions, each of which asks subjects to choose an option between a risky 
lottery and a safe lottery. We use the number of risky options chosen by a subject (which we 
denote as   {0, 1, 2, …, 10}) as a proxy of his or her risk preference. If Prediction 5 holds, 
then the average  of those who vote for the public good should be significantly smaller than that 
of those who vote for the lottery contest. 
 Nevertheless, Prediction 5 may not hold, as subjects under the public good regime may 
exhibit what recent studies found as betrayal aversion. That is, there may be some additional 
psychological cost to the subjects when other members in their groups do not contribute to their 
public accounts. They may therefore want to avoid having the public good because of the 
potential psychological damage. This cost would not be present under the contest regime. Some 
recent studies find that people are less likely to take a risk in sending money to their matched 
trustees in trust games, compared with their risk-taking behavior in structurally identical decision 
tasks without partners (e.g., Bohnet et al. 2008, Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004). Even if a subject 
is shown to be strongly risk-averse by the risk elicitation task, he may vote in favor of the lottery 
contest regime if his premium due to betrayal aversion is sufficiently high. 
4. Results 
 Ten sessions, with four per each of the two main treatments and two for the control 
treatment, were conducted at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor in April and May, 2014. 
The experiment was programmed using ztree (Fischbacher 2007). Almost all subjects were 
undergraduate students there. They were recruited via solicitation emails using a recruiting 
website, ORSEE (Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments). No subjects 
participated in more than one session. No communication was allowed during the sessions. 
Experimental sessions lasted on average one to one and a half hours, and subjects earned on 
average $22.39 (part of it was a participation fee of $5). Neutral framing was used in all 
16 
 
instructions and experiments.
15
 In this section, we will overview the subjects’ institutional 
choices and their subsequent allocation decisions. At the same time we explore the driving forces 
behind these decisions using data from additional tasks, such as their beliefs on the other 
members’ allocation decisions. 
 Table 2 reports subjects’ voting decisions and their collective vote outcomes. We find 
that a strikingly large portion of subjects, more than 70% of them in total, voted for the public 
good under each of the two voting rules, contrary to Prediction 1, which was based on standard 
theory (see the “Total” row in Table 2). Also, Prediction 4 (based on ex-ante inequality aversion) 
does not hold: the high percentages of support for the public good are statistically similar 
between the L and H treatments. This implies that the size of ex-ante expected payoff each 
subject believes or the distributions of the expected payoffs within a group may not be the only 
factors for the subjects to decide which regime to choose. In addition, the subjects’ voting 
decisions are affected little by voting rule.
16
 The last observation is not so surprising as even with 
the weighted voting rule the voting power of the Set H subjects is less than 50% and a vote cast 
by any category of subjects affects their collective decisions to some degree.  
 A closer look at the voting data by endowment category reveals that around half of the 
Set H subjects prefer having the public good whereas a larger fraction of the Set L or Set M 
subjects vote for the public good in both the L and H treatments. A regression analysis, shown in 
Appendix Table B.1, confirms that the smaller endowment the subjects are assigned, the more 
likely they are to vote for the public good.
17
 The significantly different distribution of individual 
votes by endowment leads to a significant difference in their collective vote outcomes between 
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 For instance, the terms “group fund” and “allocation” were used instead of “public good” and “contribution,” 
respectively, in the public good regime.  
16
 The number of votes for a public good under the equal voting rule (102 out of 140 votes) is not significantly 
different from that under the weighted voting rule (98 out of 140 votes) according to a two-sample z-test of 
proportion (p-value = .597, two-sided). 
17
 The regression analysis also indicates that female subjects are significantly more likely than male subjects to vote 
for the public good in the H treatment, but not in the L treatment. The lottery contest in the H treatment is more 
competitive due to a high award (z = 110). The result that women tend to stay away from competition is consistent 
with the findings of past studies (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). 
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the equal and weighted voting rules. We find that the public good regime is significantly more 
likely to be collectively chosen with the equal voting rule than with the weighted voting rule.
18
 
Result 1: Subjects’ Voting Decisions and their Collective Vote Outcomes 
(a) Prediction 1 does not hold: around 70% to 80% of the subjects vote for the public good. (b) 
The smaller endowments they are assigned, the more likely they are to vote for the public good. 
(c) The public good option is more likely to be collectively selected under the equal voting rule. 
(d) Prediction 4 does not hold: the subjects’ votes for the public good are not affected by the size 
of the award under the contest (50 points or 110 points). 
 Part of the subjects’ behavior under the collectively selected public good regime can be 
explained by inequality-averse motives. We observe strong conditional cooperative behavior 
under the public good regime for the Set M and Set L subjects. This is consistent with Prediction 
2(c). The contribution decisions of these two sets of subjects are positively proportional to their 
beliefs on the (average) allocation decisions of the Set M and Set L subjects (see Appendix Table 
B.4). This resonates with the idea that the subjects are inequality-averse agents and prefer a 
situation with a smaller inequality in payoffs through their mutual cooperation. 
Result 2: Conditional Cooperation of the Set M and L Subjects in the Public Good Regime 
The contribution decisions of the Set M and Set L subjects in the public good regime are 
positively dependent on their beliefs about the (average) contribution decisions of the Set M and 
Set L subjects. 
 However, some aspect of the subjects’ behavior under the public good regime cannot be 
explained by the inequality-averse model.  We find that a significantly smaller proportion of the 
Set H subjects, compared with the Set M or Set L subjects, contribute positive amounts in the 
public good regime (see Appendix Table B.2).
19
 This contradicts Prediction 2(b). In addition, 
this also cannot be explained by the differences between the Set H subjects and the Set M or L 
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 The number of vote outcomes having the public good under the equal voting rule (24 out of 28 cases) is 
significantly different from that under the weighted voting rule (17 out of 28 cases) according to a two-sample z-test 
of proportion (p-value = .0347, two-sided). See the hyp. columns in Table 2. 
19
 The levels of contributions are very similar between the three categories of the subjects in the L treatment due to 
the fact that one Set H subject contributed his or her full endowment. The average contribution of the Set H subjects 
(3.36) is insignificantly smaller than that of the Set M subjects (6.36) or that of the Set L subjects (5.32) in the H 
treatment. 
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subjects in their beliefs on the contribution decisions of the other members − the differences are 
not statistically significant for most of the comparisons (Appendix Table B.3).
20
 Moreover, the 
Set M and L subjects also believe that their peers in the Set H contribute significantly smaller 
percentages of the endowments than other categories of subjects do (Appendix Table B.3). Their 
anticipation turns out to be correct (Fig. 2). Although these results cannot be explained by 
inequality-aversion, they are consistent with the well-known experimental evidence that subjects’ 
allocation amounts are positively dependent on their MPCRs (e.g., Fisher et al. 1995, Zelmer 
2003). The MPCR of the Set H subjects (Set L subjects) is the lowest (highest) as shown in Eq. 
(1). In addition, it is also consistent with the findings of past studies showing that those vested 
with higher (lower) endowments cooperate less (more) in public goods games when their 
endowments are heterogeneous (e.g., Buckley and Croson 2006, Chan et al. 1996, Cherry et al. 
2005, Maurice et al. 2013). 
Result 3: Contribution Decisions of the Set H subjects in the Public Good Regime 
A significantly smaller proportion of the Set H subjects, relative to that of the Set M and Set L 
subjects, contribute positive amounts to their public accounts. 
 Despite that the Set M and Set L subjects correctly believe that Set H subjects would 
contribute a lower percentage of their endowment to the public good than they do, Set M and Set 
L subjects still believe that they would obtain significantly higher payoffs than what standard 
theory predicts under the public good regime. The average payoff that the Set H subjects believe 
they would receive, however, is not significantly higher than their own endowment amount 
(Appendix Table B.7). A subject’s believed ex-ante expected payoff is calculated by using her 
own allocation decision and her beliefs on the other four members’ allocation decisions.21 
 In the lottery contest regime, the average allocated amounts to the lottery accounts by 
each category of the subjects are smaller than the standard theoretical predictions under the risk 
neutral preference (see Table 1 and Appendix Table B.5). This implies that they are on average 
risk-averse and that they attempt to avoid receiving smaller payoffs in case of losing competition. 
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 It implies that the less frequent positive contributions by the Set H subjects cannot be explained by reciprocity 
models either. 
21
 Eq. (1) or (2) is used for this calculation. For instance, a Set M subject’s believed payoff in the public good regime 
is calculated by:               
       
     
  . Here,    is the contribution of the Set M subject, and 
  
 ,   
 , and   
  are the Set M subject’s beliefs on the contribution of the Set H member, the contribution of the other 
Set M member, and the average contribution of the two Set L members, respectively. 
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However, the overall characteristics of allocation amounts across subjects within groups stays 
close to the equilibria. We find that allocation amounts to the lottery accounts are similar among 
all subsets of the subjects (Set H, M or L) in the L treatment.
22
 We also find that the average 
allocation amounts by the Set H subjects (Set L subjects) are the highest (lowest) in the H 
treatment.  
 An exploration of the subjects’ beliefs reveals that the subjects with lower endowments 
under the contest regime overestimate the allocation amounts by their peers in the Set H 
(Appendix Table B.6). Both of the Set M and L subjects believe that the Set H subjects in their 
group allocate significantly more than 8 points (the optimal allocation amount predicted by 
standard theory with risk neutrality) to their lottery accounts in the L treatment. The Sets M and 
L subjects accordingly believe that their winning probability would be less than the standard 
theoretical predictions. In the H treatment, the Set L subjects on average believe that the Set H 
subjects in their groups allocate around 36 points to their lottery accounts, although it is not 
significantly different from the 22 points predicted by the standard theory due to small sample 
size: only two groups selected the lottery contest regime. Pessimism due to their incorrect 
estimates on the decisions of the Set H subjects may prevent the subjects with lower endowments 
from voting for the competitive regime to some degree. 
Result 4: Allocation Decisions under the Lottery Contest Regime 
The subjects in all categories allocate smaller amounts to their lottery accounts than the 
standard theoretical predictions with risk neutrality. Sets M and L subjects believe that their Set 
H subjects allocate significantly larger amounts to their lottery accounts and therefore have 
higher winning probabilities than the standard theoretical predictions in the L treatment. 
 An inter-regime comparison of the subjects’ ex-ante expected payoffs finds that material 
incentives between the public good and contest regimes differ by assigned endowment (Fig. 3 
and Appendix Table B.8). The Set L subjects on average believe that they would receive 
significantly higher expected payoffs under the public good regime in both of the L and H 
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 This result in the L treatment is different from a recent study by Corazzini et al. (2010). They find that allocation 
amounts are positively proportional to their assigned endowments in a lottery contest, where standard theory 
predicts each subject allocates the same amount. Note that in their study purchasing lottery tickets not only increases 
a chance of winning a prize but also contributes to a public good, unlike our study. Also, endowment amounts are 
private information for subjects in their study. 
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treatments. By contrast, the Set M subjects on average believe that they would obtain higher 
expected payoffs under the lottery contest regime in the H treatment, while they believe their 
payoffs would be higher under the public good regime in the L treatment. The Set H subjects on 
average believe that their expected payoffs would be higher under the lottery contest regime in 
the H treatment; but their believed payoffs are almost identical between the two regimes in the L 
treatment. These results partially explain Result 1: the smaller endowments subjects are assigned, 
the more likely they are to vote for the public good. For those with smaller endowments, unlike 
the Set H subjects, the public good regime is a materially more beneficial institution. However, 
despite the higher material incentive under the contest that the Set H and M subjects believe they 
would have, their actual voting decisions are surprisingly similar between the L and H treatments. 
This observation suggests that individuals’ voting decisions, especially the Set H subjects’, are 
driven not only by the level of their believed own ex-ante expected payoffs.  
 The ex-post payoffs of the subjects are similar to their believed ex-ante expected payoffs 
(Appendix Fig. B.1 and Table B.9). While the Set L subjects enjoy higher ex-post payoffs in both 
of the L and H treatments if the public good regime is collectively selected, the Set H subjects 
are materially better off in the H treatment if the lottery contest regime is collectively selected. 
Result 5: Believed Ex-ante Expected Payoffs between the Two Regimes 
The Set L subjects believe that they would obtain significantly higher expected payoffs under the 
public good regime, regardless of the award size in the lottery contest. The Set H and Set M 
subjects believe that they would obtain significantly higher expected payoffs under the lottery 
contest regime in the H treatment. 
 Despite Result 5, around half of the Set H subjects prefer having the public good regime 
in both of the main treatments (see Table 2). What drives this voting decision of theirs? Inter-
regime comparisons on the distributions of the subjects’ ex-ante expected payoffs and ex-post 
payoffs appear to suggest that their votes are affected by their (ex-ante or ex-post) inequality-
averse concerns.  
 First, we find the Set H subjects believe that the Gini coefficients of expected payoffs are 
significantly smaller under the public good in the L treatments (see Fig. 4(a) and Appendix Table 
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B.10).
23
 Each subject’s believed Gini coefficient in her group can be calculated using Eq. (1) or 
(2). For this calculation, ex-ante expected payoffs of the five group members are computed based 
on the subject’s own allocation decision and her beliefs on the decisions of the other four 
members’. The smaller believed Gini coefficient in the public goods regime suggests that the 
voting decisions of the Set H subjects may be affected by the difference in the ex-ante inequality 
between the two regimes.  
 Second, a similar observation can be made with ex-post inequality between the two 
regimes. Fig. 4(b) reports the average Gini coefficients of the subjects’ realized payoffs within a 
group by regime. The Gini coefficients in the lottery contest regime are on average 65% and 
135% higher than those in the public good regime in the L and H treatments, respectively.
24
 The 
significant difference in the degree of ex-post inequality between the two regimes suggests that 
the subjects’ inequality-averse motives may drive their voting decisions for the public good. Fig 
4(b) also indicates that the average ex-post Gini coefficient under the contest regime is higher in 
the H treatment than in the L treatment. Despite the higher material incentives, the subjects in the 
H treatment may be discouraged from voting for the lottery contest due to the higher ex-post 
inequality.
25
 This higher ex-post inequality in the H treatment may be the reason that Prediction 
4 does not hold. These observations resonate with the result of Brock et al. in that ex-ante 
expected payoff comparison alone cannot explain people’s decisions in a risky environment.  
Result 6: Gini Coefficients by Regime 
The Set H subjects believe that ex-ante expected payoffs are significantly more equally 
distributed under the public good regime than under the lottery contest regime in the L treatment. 
Gini coefficients of ex-post payoffs are significantly smaller under the public good regime than 
under the lottery contest regime in both the L and H treatments. 
 Another cause that could be responsible for the subjects’ collective institutional choices, 
besides the inequality aversion, is their risk attitudes (see Section 3). However, our data does not 
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 Also the Set H subjects believe that the Gini coefficients are smaller under the public good in the H treatment 
although the difference is not statistically significant due to the small number of observations under the 
endogenously selected lottery contest regime (only two groups collective selected the contests). 
24
 A Mann-Whitney test finds that the difference in the average Gini coefficient between the two regimes is 
significant in each treatment (see Appendix Table B.10). 
25
 Also notice that the Gini coefficients of ex-ante expected payoffs under the contest regime are similar between the 
L and H treatments (Fig. 4(a)).  
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support Prediction 5. The average risk attitudes () are not significantly different between the 
supporters of the public good regime and those of the lottery contest regime for each of the Sets 
H, M and L subjects, regardless of the size of awards in the contest regime (see Appendix Table 
B.11).
26
 This suggests that the risk attitudes are not the most important factor of the subjects’ 
voting decisions.  
Result 7: Risk Attitudes by Treatment 
Prediction 5 does not hold. Risk Attitudes () are not significantly different between those who 
vote for the public good regime and those who vote for the lottery contest regime in each 
category of the subjects. 
 We note that as mentioned earlier there is a possibility that the subjects’ institutional 
choices may be affected by the effects of the endogenous process. Recent research has found that 
democratic decision processes may raise people’s pro-social behavior through a number of ways 
including the effects of signals sent through voting and the democracy premium (e.g., Tyran and 
Feld 2006, Dal Bó et al. 2010, Kamei 2014). We could therefore expect that the presence of the 
endogenous process may drive their votes for the public good, assuming that some subjects have 
non-standard preferences and may enjoy a higher level of mutual cooperation when the public 
good regime is endogenously imposed. As shown in Appendix Table B.12, we find that the more 
the Set M and L subjects (the Set L subjects) expect the other members to vote for the public 
good, the more likely they are to vote for it in the L (H) treatment. In addition, for most 
categories of subsets, the supporters of the public good regime contribute larger amounts, 
compared with the supporters of the lottery contest regime; although the differences in the 
average contribution are significant only for some comparisons. This suggests that some subjects 
may prefer to collectively implement the public good and to achieve mutual cooperation with the 
help of the endogenous process. These endogenous effects alone do not explain the subjects’ 
collective institutional choices, however. The average contribution under the endogenous public 
good regime is actually slightly lower in the two endogenous treatments than in the Exogenous 
Public Good treatment (see Fig. 2). This suggests that the effects of signals and the democracy 
premium are not the most important factors that drive their institutional choices in our 
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 Also see Appendix Table B.1. A regression analysis finds that  and their votes for the public good regime are 
negatively correlated, but the correlation is not significant in each of the L and H treatments. 
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environment. This result, along with Results 6 and 7, suggest that it is more reasonable for us to 
interpret some of the Set H subjects’ voting decisions as their dislike for an unequal distribution 
of payoffs (either ex-ante believed, or ex-post) among the members. 
 One may suspect that our results on the subjects’ preferences for the public good are 
because of an insufficient size of the awards under the lottery contest regime. Accordingly, one 
may wonder how people would behave if the incentives of competition were even higher. Do the 
subjects with higher endowments still prefer having the public good rather than the lottery 
contest? How about the less-endowed subjects if their material incentive under the contest 
substantially increases? As the subjects with higher endowments have advantages over the others 
in competition, they may be inclined toward the contest regime more if the awards are 
sufficiently high. But, if their inequality-averse preferences are strong, their voting preferences 
may not be affected even if an award in the contest is sufficiently high. To gauge robustness of 
our preliminary conclusion to a very high award under the lottery contest regime, we additionally 
conducted two sessions by raising the size of the award in the contest from 110 points to 220 
points while keeping all of the other experimental setups in the main treatments as they are.
27
  
 Our additional data indicates that the average ex-ante expected payoff the Set H subjects 
believe they would receive is higher under the contest regime as in the original treatments. Even 
though their material incentives under the contest regime increases, around 43% of the Set H 
subjects still vote for the public good in the additional experiment (Appendix Table B.13). This 
is similar to Bartling et al. that find people have strong aheadness-averse preferences when self-
selecting their environment. The Gini coefficients for the subjects’ ex-post payoffs are 
significantly different between the two regimes, but not for ex-ante expected payoffs that the Set 
H subjects believed their group members would obtain in their groups. It might be the case that 
in our context, ex-post comparison matters more than ex-ante comparison, or as suggested by 
Brock et al., an inequality-averse preference based on the mixture of the ex-ante and ex-post 
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 With an award of 220 points, the equilibrium strategies based on the risk-neutral preference are: xH = 50, xM = 20 
and xL = 10; and their expected payoffs are: πH = 100, πM = 40 and πL = 20. These expected payoffs are much higher 
than those in the L and H treatments (see Table 1). Notice that the subjects’ strategic uncertainty in the public good 
regime stays the same in this additional treatment as that in the original treatments. Therefore, if people’s material 
incentive or risk aversion is the most important driving force of our results, particularly risk-loving subjects would 
be more likely to vote for a competitive contest in the additional treatment, compared with the L and H treatments. 
Note that this should hold even if some kind of betrayal aversion is prevalent under the public good regime. This is 
because the degree of the betrayal-averse motives in the additional treatment is the same as that in the L and H 
treatments. 
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fairness may better explain their behavior. A further investigation concerning their relative 
importance between ex-ante or ex-post comparison and how it differs by endowment remains for 
future research. The data shows that their risk attitudes in this treatment are not significantly 
different between the supporters of the public good and of the lottery contest. Moreover, a 
calculation of relative risk aversion that rationalizes the decisions of the Set H subjects in the 
additional treatment suggests that factors other than risk aversion and material incentives must 
have driven their voting decisions.
28
 These results support our preliminary conclusion in that the 
highly-endowed subjects’ collective institutional choices in our environment are driven more by 
social preferences such as inequality aversion. 
 The additional analysis also indicates that the average ex-ante expected payoff the Set L 
subjects believe they would obtain is higher (although insignificantly) under the contest regime 
unlike the original treatments. However, the Set L subjects’ voting preferences in this additional 
treatment are similar to those in the original treatments. Around 60% of them prefer having the 
public good regime. These results suggest that the less-endowed subjects’ choices might also 
have been substantially affected by inequality aversion in the original treatments. 
5. Conclusions 
 This paper provides the first experimental evidence concerning people’s collective 
choices between a policy that helps the less-endowed to a greater degree − a public good regime 
− and a policy that promotes competition − a competitive lottery contest regime, in a situation 
where the resources of individuals are unequally distributed. In the experiment, around 70% to 
80% of the subjects in total prefer having the public good in their groups, contrary to the 
standard theoretical predictions. The subjects with higher endowments believe that their expected 
payoffs would be higher if they choose the lottery contest when there is a possibility of winning 
a large prize.  Nevertheless, the subjects’ preferences for the public good, including those with 
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 The average expected payoff of the Set H subjects based on their beliefs is 56.1 points in the public good regime. 
The Set H subjects on average allocated 5.5 points to their lottery accounts and they believed that in total 18 points 
were allocated by the other four members in the additional treatment. This suggests that they on average believe that 
their winning probability in the competition is 5.5/(5.5+18)∙100 ≈ 23.4%. Suppose that an individual j has a CRRA 
(Constant Relative Risk Aversion) utility function, uj(x) = 
    
   
. Here r indicates the degree of relative risk aversion. 
Suppose that individual j chooses option (a) 56.1 points with a probability of 100%, instead of option (b) 264.5 = 
50−5.5+220 points (44.5 = 50−5.5+0 points) with a probability of 23.4% (76.6%), only considering her own payoff. 
Then, u(56.1)  .234∙u(264.5) + .766∙u(44.5), or, r ≈ 1.888. This means that she is ridiculously risk averse (see Table 
3 of Holt and Laury 2002).  
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higher endowments, are not affected by the size of award in the other option: lottery contest 
regime.  
 A closer look at our data reveals that the highly-endowed subjects’ institutional choices 
can be explained by inequality-averse preferences, although there is one aspect, their 
contribution decisions to the public good, that cannot be explained by it. The distributions of 
payoffs within groups − not only for ex-post payoffs but also for ex-ante expected payoffs the 
subjects believe their peers would receive in their groups − are more equal under the public good 
regime than the lottery contest regime. Our data does not support hypotheses that suggest other 
driving forces behind the subjects’ collective institutional choices. That is, the subjects’ decisions 
cannot be explained only by their risk attitudes or the effects of the endogenous decision process.  
 Our paper has two important implications regarding people’s collective institutional 
choices. First, our study suggests that people’s inequality-averse motives may be strong enough 
to drive their collective institutional choices away from competitive rules. This implies that a 
competitive scheme may not be collectively implemented in a society or an organization even 
though it may generate a materially better outcome, relative to an alternative with a public good 
aspect. Second, recent papers including Ertan et al. (2009), Putterman et al. (2011) and Kamei et 
al. (forthcoming) show that institutions that may materially benefit all members equally are more 
likely to be collectively selected when an equal voting rule is used because the majority of 
assenting votes outperform the fractions of perverse dissenting votes. Our results suggest that 
competitive policies, even if it may raise material benefits among people, may be less likely to be 
imposed with an equal voting rule (compared with a weighted voting rule) when there is an 
alternative with a public good aspect if the population’s inequality-averse preferences are 
sufficiently strong and the alternative competitive rule generates a greater inequality among 
people.  
 We acknowledge that our experimental result on people’s collective preferences for 
cooperative policies appears to contradict the light or moderate redistributive policies currently 
observed in our societies or organizations. It could be that the moderate redistributive policies 
seen in reality are consequences of the political process as briefly discussed in Section 1. We 
could also conjecture that as people collectively prefer having a cooperative policy over a 
competitive policy, policies may be pulled towards more redistributive direction in the long run. 
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Nevertheless, our study is definitely at the initial step on this topic. A further experimental or 
empirical investigation not only on people’s collective preferences but also on the effects of the 
political process in relation to policy choices is desirable. 
 As a final remark, we note that societies or organizations combine policies that promote 
competition and ones mitigate inequality unlike our simpler setup. Researchers have proposed 
the importance of blending different policies. For example, Lazear (1989) has proposed that 
when relative performance evaluations of workers are used in a firm, pay inequality among them 
should not be too large. The competitive aspect of the policy prevents the demoralization of 
high-skilled workers while the less unequal wage structure prevents workers from engaging in 
uncooperative behavior. An experimental investigation concerning how people construct 
institutions when both kinds of policies are combined remains as an area for future research. 
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 Fig. 1: Schematic Diagram of the Experimental Design 
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Table 1: Summary of Main Treatments 
         
Treatment name Award in a 
lottery 
contest 
Number of 
sessions 
Number 
of groups 
(subjects) 
Standard theoretical predictions under the risk neutral preference 
(a) Allocation decisions (b) Payoff (c) Voting  
decisions Public good Lottery contest Public good Lottery contest 
         
[Main Treatments]        
L (Low) 50 points 4 15 (75) ci = 0 
for all i 
xi = 8 
for all i 
πH = 50 
πM = 20 
πL = 10 
πH = 52 
πM = 22 
πL = 12 
All members 
vote for contest 
H (High) 110 points 4 13 (65) ci = 0 
for all i 
xH ≈ 21 
xM = 20, 
and xL = 10. 
πH = 50 
πM = 20 
πL = 10 
πH = 57.5 
πM = 27.2 
πL = 13.6 
All members 
vote for contest 
[Control Treatment]        
Exogenous Public 
Good 
 
      ---- 2 6 (30) ci = 0 
for all i 
---- πH = 50 
πM = 20 
πL = 10 
---- ---- 
         
 
Notes: 
1
 Allocations to the public account are doubled and redistributed to group members. ci is the contribution of subject i to her public account. xi is the 
allocation of subject i to her lottery account.   ,   , and    are the payoffs of Set H, Set M and Set L subjects, respectively. Besides these three treatments, one 
additional treatment was also conducted to check the robustness of our results by changing the award size in the contest regime to 220 points. See Section 4 for 
the details.
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Table 2: Voting Decisions and Outcomes 
(1) Individual conditional voting decisions 
 
 
 Treatment          category 
    
Number of votes Percentage 
 under EV1 under WV1 under EV under WV 
     
      
L treatment Set H subjects Public good 8 8 53% 53% 
 
 
Lottery contest 7 7 47% 47% 
 Set M subjects Public good 23 21 77% 70% 
 
 
Lottery contest 7 9 23% 30% 
 Set L subjects Public good 21 23 70% 77% 
 
 
Lottery contest 9 7 30% 23% 
 
      
 Subtotal Public good 52 52 69% 69% 
 
 
Lottery contest 23 23 31% 31% 
             
 
     
H treatment Set H subjects Public good 8 6 62% 46% 
 
 
Lottery contest 5 7 38% 54% 
 Set M subjects Public good 21 20 81% 77% 
 
 
Lottery contest 5 6 19% 23% 
 Set L subjects Public good 21 20 81% 77% 
 
 
Lottery contest 5 6 19% 23% 
 
      
 Subtotal Public good 50 46 77% 71% 
 
 
Lottery contest 15 19 23% 29% 
 
      
 
      
Total 
 
Public good 102 98 73% 70% 
 
 
Lottery contest 38 42 27% 30% 
             
 
(2) Collective vote outcomes 
  
      
 
 
 
  
 
Number of groups  Percentage  
  
 
EV1 WV1 EV WV 
  
 
actual
2
 hyp.
3
 actual hyp. actual hyp. actual hyp. 
  
      
 
 
 
  
      
 
 
 
 L treatment Public good 4 12 6 10 80% 80% 60% 66.7% 
  Lottery contest 1 3 4 5 20% 20% 40% 33.3% 
  
      
 
 
 
 H treatment Public good 4 12 7 7 100% 92.3% 78% 53.8% 
  Lottery contest 0 1 2 6 0% 7.7% 22% 46.2% 
  
      
 
 
 
  
      
 
 
 
 Total Public good 8 24 13 17 89% 85.7% 68% 60.7% 
  Lottery contest 1 4 6 11 11% 14.3% 32% 39.3% 
  
            
 
  
 
 
Notes: 
1
 The numbers in the EV (WV) columns in Panel (1) indicate the ones of individual voting decisions under the 
equal (weighted) voting rule. The numbers in the EV (WV) columns in Panel (2) indicate the ones of collective outcomes 
under the equal (weighted) voting rule.
 2 
The columns labeled actual indicate realized vote outcomes in groups where the 
equal or weighted voting rule was randomly assigned in the experiment. 
3
 The numbers in the hyp. columns under EV 
(WV) are the sums of (a) the numbers of realized collective outcomes under EV (WV) and (b) the numbers of unrealized 
collective outcomes based on subjects’ unused votes under the EV (WV) in groups where the WV (EV) was assigned.  
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Fig. 2: Average Contribution Decisions in the Public Good Regime 
 
Notes: Each number in this figure is calculated by: 100∙(the average contribution in the category)/(their 
endowments). Each of the “all subjects” bars is calculated by: 100∙ (the average contribution of all subjects in the 
corresponding treatment)/22. Here, 22 is the average endowment amount (= 110/5). 
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Fig. 3: Average Believed Ex-ante Expected Payoffs by Endowment and Regime 
(a) The L treatment 
 
(b) The H treatment 
 
Notes: πp (πL) are the payoffs under the public good (the lottery contest) based on the standard theoretical predictions 
with the risk-neutral preference. A subject’s believed ex-ante expected payoff is calculated based on his or her own 
allocation decision and beliefs on the decisions of the other four members. The figures of average realized payoffs 
by endowment and regime are found in Appendix Fig. B.1. 
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Fig. 4: Average Gini Coefficients of the Subjects’ Payoffs by Regime 
  (a) For believed distributions of ex-ante expected payoffs   (b) For distributions of ex-post payoffs 
 
Notes: Each bar in figure (a) indicates the average believed Gini coefficient across all the subjects or across the Set 
H subjects. Specifically, we first calculated each subject’s (i) own ex-ante expected payoff and (i) believed other 
four members’ ex-ante expected payoffs based on her allocation decision and beliefs. Eq. (1) or (2) were used in 
calculating the expected payoffs. We then calculate each subject’s Gini coefficient. Each bar in figure (b) indicates 
the average realized Gini coefficient in groups by regime. 
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